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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES OF COMPETITION
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY*
HANS-JURGEN SCHLOCIAUER*
INTRODUCTION
O NE of the most important prerequisites for the realization of the goals of
the European Economic Community and of its rules of competition' lies
in the implementation of Articles 85 and 86 of the underlying Treaty.' These
provisions form the nucleus of the Treaty's rules of competition. They provide
the legal means for the promotion of the economic order of the Community by
securing freedom of competition through its uniform regulation. The contents
and scope of the rules of competition to be applied in the Common Market were
not merely extracted from the legal systems of the signatory states, but were
designed (partly without reference to any existing prototype) to form an in-
dependent legal system with its own dogmatics and scheme. It is understandable,
therefore, that, in the light of the abundant legal problems to be solved, and
out of consideration for the special economic interests of the treaty partners in
Article 85 and 86, only the ground rules of a supranational regulation of com-
petition could be agreed upon at that time. The shaping of the rules in detail
was reserved to the directives to be published by the Council of the Community.
The first regulation directed toward the implementation of these articles was
issued by the EEC Council of Ministers in Regulation Number 17 on February
6, 1962, at the instance of the EEC Commission.3
Article 1 of Regulation 17 declares that the agreements, decisions and
concerted practices referred to in Article 85(1) of the Treaty are prohibited, no
final decision by a Community or national authority being required. On the other
band, an exemption of a restrictive practice falling within the scope of Article
*This article is adopted from Die Anwend-ung von Wettbewererbsregeln der Euro-
pdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 18 Juristenzeitung 105 (1963) by the same author.
** Professor of International law, University of Frankfurt/Main and Director of the
Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Frankfurt/Main. He is author of
several publications on international or international economic law and editor of the
"Wirterbuch des Vilkerrechts" (4 Volumes, 1960-62), to which the American Society
of International law has awarded the Certificate of Merit.
1. Cf. Schlochauer, Die Anwendung von Wettbewerbsregeln der Europiischen Wirt-
schajtsgemeinschaft, 18 Juristenzeitung 105 (1963)
2. The "Rome Treaty" [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty] was signed March 25, 1957
and has been in effect since January 1, 1958.-For a comparison between Articles 85 and
86 of the Rome Treaty and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act see Buxbaum, Antitrust
Regulation Within the European Economic Community, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 402, 404-06
(1961); see appendix following this article for the text of these provisions.
3. See 5 Amtsblatt der Europiischen Gemeinschaften 204 (February 21, 1962). As
to the Contents of the Regulation see 5 Bulletin der Europ'ischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
67 (1962); Commission of the European Economic Community, Die erste Stufe des Gemein-
samen Markts, Report on the Implementation of the Treaty (January 1958-January
1962) [hereinafter cited as Report] 60; Campbell, Regulations as to the Implementation
of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 1027 (1962).-See generally
Seidl-Hohenveldern, The First Draft Regulation of the Common Market on Restrictive
Practices, 1961 J. Bus. L. 132.
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85(1) from this prohibition can only be obtained through a declaration of non-
applicability under Article 85(3). Article 6 of Regulation 17 provides for the
granting of such a declaration by the EEC Commission. Theoretically this pro-
cedure is preferable to a system of legal exemptions, which approaches the
"Missbrauchs-prinzip" (i.e., a system of market regulation in which control is
exercised only upon the finding of abuse of market position). In practice, how-
ever, it has led to an overburdening number of applications for declarations
under Article 85(3).
I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES
The attainment of the objectives of the EEC will have far-reaching effects
on the structure and the functioning of the national economies of the Member
States. Although there was much to be said for putting into effect on the same
date the measures provided for in the Treaty,4 it was agreed not to attempt to
realize all of the Treaty's objectives at once.5 Upon consideration of the effects
of these measures, a transitional period of twelve, or in some circumstances up
to fifteen years was provided for by the Treaty.0 During this period, which con-
sists of three stages, 7 the economic integration of the Member States is to be
gradually effected. The result of the step-by-step realization of the Treaty's
goals is that the commands and obligations set out in the EEC Treaty become
binding not all at the same time, but that each category of these provisions
comes into force upon reaching the appropriate stage of integration.8 All meas-
ures set out for each stage of the transitional period must be introduced and
carried out together, so that all sectors of the economy are covered as uniformly
as possible.9 Only at the end of the transitional period will the objectives of the
Treaty be fully realized.
In a number of cases the application of the Treaty's principles requires the
enactment of more concrete measures, in the form, inter alia, of regulations by
the Markets' authorities of each stage of integration. In contrast with this gradual
implementation is the Treaty's prohibition against any activity inimical to in-
tegration.10 This provision imposed an immediate obligation on the Member
States to cease any action likely to impede or jeopardize the integration process.
Thus, Member States are enjoined from taking steps which, measured by the
Treaty's objectives, would impair the status quo as of the effective date of the
4. See von der Groeben-von Boeckh, 1 Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag 23 (1958)
5. Von der Groeben-von Boeckh, supra note 4, at 23.
6. EEC Treaty art. 8.
7. As to the development in practice during the first phase of implementation of the
Treaty, see Report, oP. cit. supra note 3, at 18.
8. See generally Das Verhdiltnis des deutschen Kartellrechts zu den kartellrechtlichen
Vorschriften des Vertrages iiber die Grfindung der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,
Legal Opinion- [hereinafter cited as Rechtsgutachten]-presented by the Institute for
International and Foreign Trade Law, Frankfurt on Main, 7 Schriften des Instituts fUr
auslindisches und internationales Wirtschaftsrecht Frankfurt am Main 12 (1958).
9. Von der Groeben-von Boeckh, sura note 4, at 24. EEC Treaty art. 5(2).
10. EEC Treaty arts. 12, 31, 53, 62, 76.
EEC REGULATION OF COMPETITION
Treaty. Specific provisions supplementing this prohibition are to be found else-
where in the Treaty."
The parties in adhering to the Treaty aim at the economic integration of
their national markets in a Common Market.1 2 To this end, it is expressly
stipulated that customs duties and quantitive restrictions on importation and
exportation of goods be eliminated, that a common custom tariff toward third
countries be established, that the obstacles to the free movement of persons,
services and capital be removed, and that a common agricultural and transport
policy be inaugurated and social services be coordinated. 13
Since the signing of the Treaty, the general programs outlined by the EEC
Commission for the removal of limitations on the free movement of persons and
services have been partially executed. These programs consisted of three sets of
directives issued by the Council of Ministers. The first, issued in February 1964,
sought the abolition of travel and residence restrictions imposed on citizens of
the Member States. It aimed at achieving the freedom of establishment and free
supply of services in the wholesale trade as well as in intermediary activities in
trade, industry and the crafts. Reinsurance and retrocession were also covered. 14
The second set, issued in July 1964, was concerned with the actualization of free
movement of persons and services for independent endeavors in certain process-
ing and manufacturing activities in industry, the crafts and mining, including
the extraction of gravel and sand.15 The last supplementary directive set out
the details for transitory measures in the processing and manufacturing fields.' 6
Set out in particular were the conditions under which diplomas, examination
certificates and other qualifying certificates were to be mutually recognized.
The Member States were to comply with the three sets of directives by the end
of 1964.
The economic objectives of the Common Market can be prejudiced through
activities other than those emanating from a Member State. Agreements in the
private sector of the economy, concerted practices and the exploitation of market
dominating positions can produce the same or similar effects. True, such agree-
ments and practices may lack the binding force of public enactments, but eco-
nomic pressure, through the exercise of private market power, can be a mean-
ingful substitute for public sanction. It follows that renunciation alone by
Member States of protectionistic measures is not a sufficient guarantee for a
free economic community. Market positions favored by such protectionistic
activities forbidden to the States by the Treaty should not be allowed to be
maintained through the use of economic power by the private sector. To be fully
11. These prohibitions are described and discussed in detail in Rechtsgutachten, op. cit.
supra note 8.
12. EEC Treaty art. 2.
13. EEC Treaty art. 3. See Ipsen-Nicolaysen, Bericht jiber die aktuelle Entwick-
lung des Gemeinschajtsrechts, 17 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 964 (1964).
14. See 7 Amtsblatt der Europilschen Gemeinschaften 845 (April 4, 1964).
15. See 7 Amtsblatt der Europiischen Geneinschaften 1871 (July 23, 1964).
16. See id. at 1863.
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and absolutely effective a policy directed toward the organization of a free
economic community must arrange itself against private restrictive practices.
17
The rules of competition in the EEC Treaty are directed to this end.
18 They
are designed to protect the building of the Common Market from disruptions
caused by cartels or market dominating enterprises. And while this aspect of the
provisions is of particular importance in the formative period, they have a second
function of a general and permanent nature: the protection of competition in
the market from frustration by private restrictive trade practices, one of the
Treaty's general goals. 9 This double function demonstrates the important role
of the rules of competition in the structure of the Common Market.
2 0
II. Gi-DuA IMPLEMENTATION AND SCOPE OF REGULATION
The realization of the Common Market raised a serious question in regard
to the provisions governing cartels. Did these provisions enter immediately into
full force with the Treaty or would they become effective only at a later date?
This question, which led to well-known controversies among commentators
1
has two important aspects.
It cannot be maintained that Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty were of no
legal force before the issuance of the directives suggested by Article 87. The
implementation of Articles 85 and 86 prior to that time is provided for, within
certain limits, in Article 88. However, the provisions regulating cartels could
not enter into full force until the issuance of the implementing directives. In its
decision of April 6, 1962, in the Bosch case the Court of Justice of the European
Communities22 stated that the provisions of Articles 88 and 89 prevent com-
plete application of Article 85. In Article 85, the prohibition of paragraph I
and the possibility of a declaration of non-applicability contained in paragraph
17. Cf. Report, op. cit supra note 3, at 56.
18. EEC Treaty arts. 85-86.
19. See EEC Treaty art. 3(f).
20. As to the significance of the antitrust rules for the joint system of the Common
Market, see especially Kronstein, The Significance of the Provisions Concerning Restraints
of Competition within the Total Perspective of the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty and the European Economic Community Treaty (Reports on Supranational and
National European and American Law, presented to the International Conference on Re-
straints of Competition at Frankfurt on Main, edited by the Institute for International
and Foreign Trade Law in Frankfurt on Main), 1 Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law
111 (1961). See also Buxbaum, Patent licensing: A Case Study on Antitrust Regulation
within the European Economic Community 9 Antitrust Bull. 103-111 (1964); Deringer,
Europiisches Wettbewerbsrecht im Werden, 6 Die Aktiengesellschaft 189 (1961); von der
Groeben, Wettbewerb im Gemeinsamen Markt, 16 Europa-Archiv 643 (1961); GUnther,
Harmonisierung der Wettbewerbsbedingungen: Voraussetzung der Wirtschajtsunion, 19 Der
Betriebs-Berater [hereinafter cited as BB] 3, 4 (1964); Spaak-Jaeger, The Rules of Com-
petition within the European Common Market, Law & Contemp. Prob. 485 (1961);
Thiesing, Rules Governing Competition Within the European Regional Communities, Law
& Contemp. Prob. 464 (1961); Wolf, Zum Kartellrecht der EWG, 12 Wirtschaft und
Wettbewerb [hereinafter cited as WuW] 645 (1962).
21. See von der Groeben-von Boeckh, op. cit. supra note 4, at 258; Rechtsgutachten,
supra note 8, at 8.
22. See Legal Affair No. 13/61, published in Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz and Ur-
heberrecht (Auslands- und Internationaler Teil) 307 (1962); WuW, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 524 (Entscheidungssammlung EWG/MUV 48).
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3 form an unseparable unity. The Court reasoned that it would be contrary to
the principle of legal certainty to declare certain agreements void before it
could be decided which agreements were covered by Article 85 in its entirety.
On this point, the Court stated: "An opposite interpretation would lead to the
intolerable consequence that these cartel agreements would first have been void
for several years without any authority having established the fact, and that
subsequently this nullity would be revoked with retroactive effect." A change in
this legal situation has been brought about by the issuance of Regulation 17
which sets out rules of procedure governing the measures to be taken by the
EEC Commission in the implementation of the anti-trust provisions of the
Treaty. It stipulates in Article 1 that "agreements, decisions and concerted
practices referred to in Article 85(l) of the Treaty and the abuse of a market-
dominating position within the meaning of Article 86 shall be prohibited, no
prior decision to this effect being required." The Treaty provided that the effec-
tive date of Regulation 17 was March 13, 1962.23 From that date, the prohibi-
tions expressed in Articles 85(1) and 86 were applicable without the requirement
of any decision to that effect. Thus, the decision of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities in Bosch and Regulation 17 have solved an important
problem concerning the application of the anti-trust provision of the EEC Treaty.
There is, however, still another equally important problem for which there
has been no authoritative decision to silence the commentators' discussions.
Neither the Bosch decision nor Regulation 17 addressed themselves to the scope
of the cartel prohibition. The Court in Bosch declined on procedural grounds to
decide the principal question, whether the export prohibition agreement involved
fell within the scope of Article 85(1). From the wording of Regulation 17 it is
not clear whether the prohibitions contained in Articles 85(1) and 86 should
be effective to the fullest extent during the transitional period or whether they
should be effectuated gradually, in accordance with the step-by-step realization
of the Common Market. This question is different from the one discussed above.
The former concerns the effect of the Treaty's provisions on agreements and
practices which fall within their scope. The question at hand, however, is to
determine to which agreements and practices the provisions are actually applica-
ble in the various stages of the transitional period. The EEC Treaty does not
specifically answer this question. In resolving it, therefore, the general principles
set out by the Treaty for the building of the Common Market must be taken
into consideration. These do not contemplate a full-scale application of a common
market policy at once, but a step-by-step development of such a policy. It follows
that the Treaty's provisions governing competition should not be interpreted as
fully applicable from the very enactment of the Treaty. It is not likely that
where the general economic policies of the Member States are to be assimilated
gradually, the rules of competition should be implemented immediately with the
utmost stringency. In this connection it is important to take into consideration
23. EEC Treaty art. 191.
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the dual function of the Treaty's rules of competition.24 During the transitional
period these rules are only applicable to the extent to which they attempt to
protect the building of the Common Market against disruptions caused by
powerful private interests. On the other hand, they will come into full force, as
principles of a uniform economic policy, at the end of the transitional period
and the realization of the Common Market. Thus, the actual importance of
Articles 85 and 86 lies in the protection afforded the step-by-step integration proc-
ess and its end results against disruptive measures of the private sector. There-
fore, the prohibitions laid down in the articles are at present effective insofar as
they come to grips with private activities equivalent in substance and effect to
such public intervention as the Treaty directly prohibits. This results not only
in the prohibition of such private economic measures as contain restraints of
competition beyond the status quo at the effective date of the Treaty, but also
prohibits, consistent with the objectives of the Treaty and the above mentioned
relation between the rules of competition and the step-by-step development of
the Common Market, agreements and restrictions which replace public inter-
vention without actually impairing the status quo. It would be meaningless to
remove governmental restrictions while allowing the frustration of this process
by private measures. 25
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty organizing the construction
of the Common Market in several stages, the EEC Commission need only con-
cern itself at the present time with gross violations of the provisions of Articles
85(1) and 86. The more the Common Market develops through the removal of
customs and quota barriers, the more rigorously will the Commission have to
proceed against anti-competitive activities. Such a procedure, however, involves
the risk that private enterprises will not be able to determine for themselves the
exact moment on which the progress in the integration of the Common Market
turns a previously permissible restraint of competition into a proscribed one. In
view of the emphasis placed by the Court of Justice in the Bosch decision20 on
the principle of legal certainty, suitable measures to eliminate the above men-
tioned uncertainty will have to be taken.
III. DECLARATION OF NON-APPLICABILITY
The primary procedure of the EEC Commission is the declaration of non-
applicability under Article 85(3).27 The declaration has the effect of law and
precludes the application of Article 85(1). Declarations extending to categories
of agreements, decisions and concerted activities are also provided for in Article
85(3) ,28 and therefore, although Regulation 17 makes no provision for such
24. Cf. supra pt. I, par. 3, this article.
25. See Rechtsgutachten, supra note 8, at 27.
26. See supra note 22.
27. See Deringer, The Distribution of Powers in the Enforcement of the Rule of
Competition Under the Rome Treaty, 1 Common Market L. Rev. 30 (June, 1963).
28. See Gleiss, Gruppenfreistellungen vom EWG-Kartellverbot in Sicht, 17 Neue Ju-
ristische Wochenschrift 958 (1964).
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group exemptions, the possibility of declarations for such categories of private
arrangements should not be excluded. Such an exclusion would require an ex-
press ruling in the light of the provisions of Article 85(3). It may be assumed
that the "declaration according to Article 85(3) of the Treaty" mentioned in
Articles 6, 8, 9 and 10 of Regulation 17 pertains also to the categories of agree-
ments, decisions and concerted activities,2 9 if the other formal and material
prerequisites for such a declaration are met.
Under Article 9(1) of Regulation 17, the power to issue a declaration under
Article 85(3) is vested solely in the EEC Commission. Procedurally, such a
declaration requires a notification in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Regu-
lation.30 It is questionable whether this requirement applies also to those agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practices enumerated in Article 4(2) which are
exempted from Article 4(1). It must be assumed that the exemption applies
only to the general duty to notify, and that declarations of non-applicability
always require a notification, which, of course, is also possible under Article
4(2). 1 A declaration for categories of agreements can only be issued if the
categories consist exclusively of agreements, decisions and concerted practices
brought to the attention of the Commission.
The declaration of non-applicability under paragraph 3 of Article 85 has
the effect of precluding application to the practices therein mentioned of the
prohibition of paragraph 1. Therefore, the mere fact of the existence of a con-
dition proscribed by paragraph 1 cannot of itself give rise to a presumption of
its invalidity under paragraph 2 or to the possibility of sanctions or claims for
compensatory damages. However, the force of national cartel prohibitions will
not be limited by a declaration under Article 85(3). This should follow from the
wording of the provision which avoids mention of "permission" and speaks only
of the "non-applicability" of Article 85(1).2 It is stated in Article 9(3) of
Regulation 17 that "as long as the EEC Commission has not initiated any
procedure pursuant to Articles 2, 3 or 6 [of the Regulation], the authorities of
the Member States shall remain competent to apply their national law in har-
mony with Articles 85(1) and 86 in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty."
The declaration of non-applicability under Article 85 (3) binds the Commis-
sion in principle and can be revoked by it only through compliance with the
narrowly defined provisions set out in Article 8 of Regulation 17, namely, an
29. See European Parliament, Stellungnahme zu dem Vorschlag einer Verordnung
Uiber die Anwendung von Artikel 85(3) des EWG-Vertrages auf Gruppen von Verein-
barungen, Beschhiissen und aufeinander abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen, 7 Amtsblatt der
Europliischen Gemeinschaften 1275 (May 27, 1964).
30. See also Newes, New Antitrust Developments in the Common Market, CCII Com-
mon Market Rep. p. 15, ff 115 (June 1962).
31. See Merkblatt der EWG-Kommission zu Artikel 85 und 86 des EWG-Vertrages
und ihren Durchfiihrungsverordnungen. It contains in its 2d part (III) and in the 3d part
(VII) detailed remarks concerning the formalities to be observed in application of the
antitrust rules or in case of invocation of their protective function.
32. See Schumacher, Das Verfahren zur Durchfiihrung der Artikel 85 und 86 des
EWG-Vertrages, Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law, op. cit. supra note 20, at 347-48.
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important change in circumstances, infringement of a stipulation of the declara-
tion, abuse of the declaration or procurement of the declaration through false
information.
Although the practical effect of the declaration of non-applicability is that
of a permission, it must be regarded as a decision in the sense of Article 189 (4)
of the Treaty.3 3 A declaration under Article 85 (3) can therefore be appealed to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities according to Article 173 (2).34
Any natural or juristic person affected directly and specifically by the decision is
entitled to bring the claim; this may include competitors who would resist a
declaration of non-applicability for a category of practices. The courts of the
Member States, however, cannot themselves decide the validity of a declaration,
but must seek in the event of a dispute a preliminary finding of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities according to Article 177(lb) of the
Treaty. This applies also to courts not of the last instance in spite of the word-
ing of Article 177(3), because, in contrast to the interpretation of Community
law itself, review of the legality of acts done by Community organs is reserved
to the supranational Court.85
The declaration of non-applicability seems usable in principle also during
the transitional period, for, under the terms of Article 8(1) of Regulation 17,
the declaration may be given only for a definite period and may be revoked or
altered if conditions leading to the granting of the clearance have substantially
changed. Such a change may be the attainment of a different state of development
of the Common Market itself, if the effects of arrangements in the private sector
depend on a particular state.30 The declaration of non-applicability, however,
is not suited in all cases to the attainment of the goals determined upon for the
transitional period. The declaration presupposes the existence of one of the
factual situations set out in Article 85 (1). Frequently, however, there are agree-
ments, decisions, and concerted practices which do not fall within the scope of
Article 85(1) in the formative period of the Common Market.8 7 Furthermore,
Article 85(3) sets out additional prerequisites-improvement in production or
distribution of goods or advancement of technical or economical progress while
reserving to users a fair share in the profit-which, related to the factual patterns
considered, may not be manifest in the transitional period.
33. See von der Groeben-von Boeckh, 2 Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag 175 (1960).
34. As to actions pursuant to Article 173(2) EEC-Treaty see Diag, Die Gerichts-
barkdt in der Europiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europdischen Atom gemein.
schaft, 83 Archly des 5ffentlichen Rechts 132, 164 (1958). With regard to corresponding
provisions of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, see Seblochauer, Die
Gerchtsbarkeit der Europ5ischen Gemeinschaft fir Kohle und Stahl, 3 Archiv des V6I-
kerrechts 385, 400 (1951/52).
35. See Gottschlich, Nachpriifbarkeit von EWG-Entscheidungen durch den Europdischen
Gerichtshof im Verfahren der Vorabentscheidung, 10 Aussenwirtschaftsdient des Betriebs-
beraters 43 (1964).
36. See Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction Over Antitrust Matters in the
European Economic Community, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 56 (1964).
37. Cf. supra pt. I, par. 2, and pt. II, par. 2, this article.
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IV. NEGATIVE CLEARANCE
A second procedure available to the EEC Commission is the negative clear-
ance under Article 2 of Regulation 17,38 a procedure not provided for in the
EEC Treaty itself. It was, however, permissible to create it in the implementing
regulation, since it does not interfere in and of itself with the rights of those
subject to the Community law. Articles 19 and 21 of the Regulation designate
the negative clearance as a "decision," but such a "decision" is undoubtedly not
equivalent to the "decision" referred to in Article 189 of the Treaty. "Decisions"
in the formal sense of that Article are "binding in every particular upon those
to whom it is addressed." But the negative clearance lacks such external binding
force. The Commission, upon application by participating enterprises or associa-
tions of enterprises, merely establishes under Article 2 of the Regulation that
"according to information it has obtained, there are, under Article 85(1) or
Article 86 of the Treaty, no grounds for it to intervene with respect to an agree-
ment, decision or practice."39 The clearance, therefore, amounts to formalized
legal advice that the Commission does not intend to take action under Articles
85(1) or 86 on certain submitted facts.40 A binding decision is not rendered as to
whether the factual pattern in all respects falls outside the Treaty prohibitions
or that the Commission in its discretion has chosen not to act.
It is not clear from the wording of Regulation 17 whether the negative
clearance is meant for isolated cases only or also for groups of agreements, de-
cisions and practices. Although Article 2 of the Regulation refers to intervention
with respect to "an" agreement, "a" decision or "a" practice, it is questionable
whether this implies application only to an actual isolated case. Neither the tenor
of the Treaty nor policy grounds can justify such a limited interpretation. From
the third term used in Article 2 of the Regulation: "a practice" it follows that the
singular form can be adopted by a number of persons in a number of isolated
cases. Similarly, an interpretation of "an agreement" as meaning a certain type
of agreement would not be contrary to the wording of the Article. The same
reasoning applies to "a decision." Such an interpretation does not expand the
authority of the EEC Commission beyond its limits. A negative clearance con-
cerning certain standardized groups of agreements, decisions or practices does
not interfere more with the rights of the parties involved than a negative clear-
38. See Deringer, Inhalt und Auswirkungen der ersten Kartellverordnung der Euro-
pdischen Wirtschaftsgemneinschajt, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht (Auslands-
und Internationaler Tell) 283, 285 (1962); Schlieder, Die Anwendung der Artikel 85 und 86
des EWG-Vertrages nach dem BrIass der ersten Durchfi hrungsverordnung, 17 BB 305, 308
(1962). See also Merkblatt der EWG-Kommission, op. cit. supra note 31, at 2d part (-I,
IV) and 3d part (VII).
39. The first negative clearance ruling dated March 11, 1964, was published in 7
Amtsblatt der Europ~iischen Gemeinschaften 915 (1964). See comment by Gleiss & Hirsch,
Das erste Negativattest der EWG-Kommission, 17 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1604
(1964).
40. See Deringer, supra note 38, at 285; Schlieder, supra note 38, at 308. Both argue
that the negative clearance is "more than mere information" or "no informal information."
This corresponds with the special regulation which, however, does not principally touch the
character of the negative clearance as an information.
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ance applied to a single case. On the contrary, it would thus be possible for the
parties concerned to get a decision on their application at an earlier time. The
requirement of an application by the parties concerned remains in the case of
a negative clearance concerning a category of activities. This limits the possibili-
ties of the application of this form of procedure.
Regulation 17 does not address itself specifically to the binding force of a
clearance on the EEC Commission itself, and does not mention the possibility
of a revocation. From the wording of Article 2 of the Regulation, however, it is
clear that the Commission is at liberty to intervene when the information form-
ing the basis for the issuing of the clearance proves to be untrue or incomplete,
or when the underlying circumstances have changed after the granting of the
clearance. The "information . . . obtained" by the Commission as the basis
for the negative clearance, as mentioned in Article 2 of the Regulation, includes
especially the development stage of the Common Market. This stage is decisive
for the establishment of the effects of the agreements, decision or practices with
which the negative clearance deals. An advancement in development affects
basically the grounds on which the negative clearance has been granted. The
principles of legal certainty and legal clarity therefore call for an express refer-
ence in the negative clearance to the fact that it is based upon the developmental
stage and to the possibility of a revocation in case of a change in the underlying
factual pattern. On the other hand, although still an open question, the Commis-
sion should not be able to disregard a given clearance in case of a change in
legal opinions rather than in factual circumstances. One reason for this conclu-
sion is the fact that the negative clearance is to be granted by a formal procedure,
which calls for a publication of the application and the guarantee of a hearing
for all parties involved and interested. Another justification for holding that the
Commission be bound by its clearance opinion, is to be found in Article 15 (la)
of Regulation 17. This punishes the supplying of false or misleading informa-
tion-which could include incompleteness on a basic issue-with fines ranging
from one hundred to five thousand units of account.41
While the EEC Commission is bound to its opinion given in a negative clear-
ance, this opinion is by no means conclusive for the cartel authorities of the
Member States. The issue involved in a negative clearance is the desire of the
EEC Commission to intervene in a particular case, for which the legal signifi-
cance of the factual pattern is merely a preliminary question. However, if the
Commission has initiated a clearance procedure, the national authorities are
limited to that extent in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty by the
provision of Article 9(3) of Regulation 17. Since this provision does not apply
to the courts of the Member States, their competence in these matters is not
restricted by a clearance.42 A negative clearance has no binding effect in a
41. A unit is fictitious EEC money roughly equivalent to one U.S. dollar. Oberdorfer,
Gleiss & Hirsch, Common Market Law ff 459 (1963).
42. See Deringer, supra note 38, at 286. Concerning the delimitation of competencies
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lawsuit before a national court, and its validity and interpretation will have little
influence on the result of such a lawsuit. As provided by the Treaty, it is there-
fore not possible in such cases to request an adjudication by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities.43 However, the existence of a negative clearance
may be an important indirect factor in lawsuits before national courts. For
instance, the clearance may lead to the ruling out of any intentional fault of
the applicant.
For the purpose of attacking the issuance of a negative clearance or the
failure to issue the same, there is available the action to set aside a decision as
provided in Article 173(2) of the Treaty, or the "Untitigkeitsklage," similar
to "writ of mandamus," mentioned in Article 175 of the Treaty.44 The former
would attempt to void a negative clearance, the latter to compel the EEC Com-
mission to act. In an action based upon Article 173(2) of the Treaty, three ques-
tions arise. First, is the negative clearance a "decision" in the sense of Article
173(2) of the Treaty? Second, does it "directly and individually" concern the
competitor who in most cases will be the complainant? Third, should the nega-
tive clearance be declared void-which would be the normal result of such an
action if the Court decides in favor of the plaintiff-even though it may be con-
sidered to have created an estoppel during its existence in favor of the party to
whom the clearance was granted? This would rule out fault of these parties,
which excludes the possibility of imposing sanctions or fines and rules out dam-
age claims.
The "Untitigkeitsklage," if requested by a competitor, raises another prob-
lem. According to the provisions of the Treaty, the object of such a suit is to
compel an action addressed toward the plaintiff. In the case of a negative clear-
ance, however, the desired action would be addressed toward the receiver of the
clearance. A solution may lie in the interpretation of Article 175 of the Treaty
so that it covers all such actions which directly and individually concern the
plaintiff.
4 5
The negative clearance seems to be applicable not only to isolated cases,
but also to groups of parallel agreements, decisions and practices for which at
least a temporary exemption from the prohibition of Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty has been asked. It appears to be a very useful means for the gradual im-
plementation of the rules of competition of the Treaty, especially during the
transitional period.
between the Court of Justice of the European Community and National Courts, see Hay,
Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court, 12 Am. J. Comp. L. 21, 30 (The Su-
premacy of the Community Court) and 35 (Treaty Law in National Courts) (1963). See
also Buergenthal, The Private Appeal Against Illegal State Activities in the European Coal
and Steel Community, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 325 (1962).
43. EEC Treaty art. 177.
44. See Daig, supra note 34, at 177. As to the law on the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty, cf. Schlochauer, supra note 34, at 402, 407.
45. Cf. von der Groeben-von Boeckh, op. cit. supra note 33, at 141.
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V. INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS
A further possibility available to the Commission in the application of
Articles 85 and 86 is an interpretative declaration, according to which certain
categories or forms of agreements, decisions and practices affecting competition
are exempted from the prohibition of Article 85(1) for a definite term of the
transitional period. Such an interpretative declaration is to be distinguished
from the declaration of non-applicability under Article 85(3). The interpreta-
tive declaration is not an exemption from the prohibitions but a finding that the
factual pattern under consideration does not constitute a violation. The inter-
pretative declaration differs also from the negative clearance. Not only is there
a finding of no grounds for intervention-a matter being basically in the discre-
tion of the Commission-but also that there is an absence of a factual pattern
falling within the scope of Article 85(1).
A declaration as above alluded to is not provided for in the Treaty or
Regulation 17. Nor can such a declaration readily be placed among-any one of
the categories of legal acts enumerated in the Treaty.40 It does, however, closely
resemble the "opinion" provided for therein. The "opinion" is a statement of
views in all matters covered by the Treaty which has no legal force and can be
delivered as the Commission finds necessary, since no application or formal
procedure is required pursuant to the general authorization of the Treaty.
4 7
If an interpretative declaration is not to be equated to an "opinion," it may be
treated as an informal statement of the Commission, to be sure a modus operandi
not provided for by the Treaty, but one which requires no special authorization,
since it interferes neither with the rights of other Treaty bodies or of the Member
States, or those of enterprises covered by the Community law.
An interpretative opinion would be a legal opinion of the Commission but
not a legally binding order. The binding effect of the declaration on the Com-
mittee itself would have to be determined by the general principles concerning
legal advice and waivers. A declaration which later proves erroneous, although
revocable under general principles of law, would be effective as a defense for the
activity until its revocation. The principle of estoppel (Vertrauensschutz) would
prevent establishing guilt or imposing sanctions. When inquiring into the bind-
ing effect of interpretative declarations of the Commission on the other organs
of the Community, one should avoid the misleading term "authentic interpreta-
tion." An "authentic interpretation" has the same binding force as the rule of
law interpreted, and therefore can only be enunciated by those organs of the
Community empowered to alter the law itself. This authority is not solely within
the competence of the Commission. Therefore, the Commission through such an
46. EEC Treaty art. 189. The enumeration of legal acts in Article 189 is not conclusive.
See von der Groeben-von Boeckh, op. cit. supra note 33, at 166; Everling, Die ersten
Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europischen Gemeinschaflen, 14 BB 52, 53 (1959).
47. EEC Treaty art. 155.
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interpretative declaration cannot infringe upon the freedom of interpretation of
the Council or the Court of Justice.
The binding force of an interpretative declaration on the authorities and
courts of the Member States is not provided for in the Treaty and is not to be
presumed. One may only question whether the competence of the national au-
thorities to make their own interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 is narrowed by
an interpretative declaration of the Commission under the terms of Article 9(3)
of Regulation 17. This competence exists only so long as the Commission has not
initiated a procedure pursuant to Articles 2, 3 or 6 of Regulation 17. However,
grave considerations weigh against an analogous application of the provision of
Article 9(3) of Regulation 17 to the issuance of an interpretative declaration.
The three situations delineated in Article 9 concern proceedings regulated by
law under which the Commission adjudicates specific cases or defined categories
of specific cases. It would be reasonable to rule out parallel proceedings by the
national authorities. The interpretative declaration is not grounded in actuality
and does not result from a factual investigation. Therefore the competence of
the authorities of the Member States as outlined in Article 9(3) would in no
way be limited by an interpretative declaration. The legal position of the courts
of the Member States is similar to that existing under the negative clearance,
namely, they are not bound by the declaration. Consequently, the interpretative
declaration in and of itself offers no ground to request a preliminary decision
from the Court of Justice under the Treaty.48 However, if the interpretative
declaration is bound up in a controversy before a national court, the question
raised may be submitted to the Court of Justice.49 Submission of the question
is obligatory only when the national court is a court of last, resort. To be dis-
tinguished from this problem-as in the case of negative clearance-is the actual
effect of an interpretative declaration of the Commission. The national courts
must consider, in following an erroneous declaration (for example in an action
for damages) whether the declaration has precluded damages for fault. The
absence of actionable fault, however, does not exclude the possibility of injunctive
relief.
An action to set aside an interpretative declaration before the Court of
Justice of the Communities according to Article 173 is not possible, since such
a declaration lacks the character of a "decision." However, according to Article
175, an "Untatigkeitsklage" could possibly be brought compelling the Commis-
sion to act in a manner other than that set out in its declaration. Further, the
possibility of a claim for damages against the Community itself should not be
excluded, if an interpretation of the Commission proves erroneous, since it is
possible that no fault, and consequently no damages, could be attributed to the
competitor who has followed the interpretation.
Because of its wide range of inherent possibilities, the interpretative decla-
48. EEC Treaty art. 177.
49. Ibid.; see Buxbaunm, supra note 36, at 74-80.
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ration of the Commission should prove an important tool in the gradual imple-
mentation of the Treaty's rules of competition.
VI. PROBLEM OF DELAY
One other problem area remains to be discussed. There is a considerable
period of time between the notification of a cartel agreement (aimed at a declara-
tion of non-applicability) or the application based on Article 2 of Regulation 17
(aimed at a negative clearance) and the decision on such notification or appli-
cation. During this period, economic activities related to the restrictive trade
practices involved could already have been put into effect.
The fines for infringing Article 85(1) or 86 of the Treaty provided for in
Article 15(2a) of the Regulation may not be imposed, according to Article
15(5a) of the Regulation for actions taking place "after the notification to the
Commission and prior to its decision regarding the application of Article 85 (3)
of the Treaty insofar as these actions do not go beyond the limits of the
activity described in the notification." 50 In accordance with Article 15(6) of
the Regulation, the fines may be imposed "once the Commission has informed
the enterprises concerned that after a preliminary examination it considers
that the conditions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty have been fulfilled and that
application of Article 85(3) is not warranted."5 ' In the absence of such notice,
the notification under Article 4 of the Regulation will insulate the notificant
from fines but has no further consequences. In particular, it does not affect
the civil law interpretation of the activities involved. Expenses incurred by
the applicants in the expectation of a declaration of non-applicability cannot
be claimed, even iftfhe duration of the procedure is excessively long. Further-
more, the insulation from fines does not alter the principle that such restraints
of competition which have to be notified are basically prohibited and can only
be legalized by a decision provided for in Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty.
Since there is no provision parallel to that of Article 15(5) of Regulation
17 concerning the period between application for and decision on a negative
clearance, the legal problems involved here are basically different. It has been
concluded therefrom that, in contrast to Article 15(5) of the Regulation, the
imposing of fines in these cases would be allowed, the Commission retaining the
discretion to refrain from doing so.52 There is, however, much to be said for a
corresponding application of Article 15(5) of the Regulation in cases where an
application for a negative clearance is under consideration. 3 The similarity of
facts and proceedings in both cases, as well as the fact that the applicant for a
negative clearance assumes his activities to be lawful while the notificant under
Article 4 of the Regulation assumes his practices to be prohibited, are strong
50. See Newes, supra note 30, at 17, ff 119.
51. The Commission of the European Economic Community first implemented this
provision in dealing with the production and marketing of gravel by numerous Dutch,
Belgian and German enterprises.
52. See Schlieder, supra note 38, at 308.
53. See Deringer, supra note 38, at 286.
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arguments for this conclusion. The application has no effect on the consequences
under civil law of the activities which form the subject of the application. This
follows directly by an argumentum a majore ad minus from the fact that a
negative clearance, once it has been granted, does not affect the consequences
under civil law whatsoever. A delay in the decision on the application for a
negative clearance does not generally entitle the applicant to conclude that the
Commission will tacitly tolerate the practices concerned. If, therefore, he al-
ready has incurred expenses in trying to obtain the clearance, he cannot claim
any compensation in the event of a subsequent rejection. It seems advisable
that the EEC Commission expressly refer to this legal situation in a form




(1) Incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited are all agreements be-
tween or among enterprises, decisions of associations of enterprises and concerted practices
which are apt to affect adversely trade between member states and which have as their
purpose or effect a prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market, in particular:
(a) direct or indirect fixing of purchase or sales prices or of other terms and condi-
tions of doing business;
(b) limitation or control of production, distribution, technical development or in-
vestments;
(c) allocation of markets or sources of supply;
(d) application of unequal terms to parties furnishing equivalent considerations,
whereby they are placed at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) subjecting the conclusion of contracts to the condition that the other parties to
them accept additional goods or services which are unrelated to the subject matter
of the contract either by their nature or by commercial custom.
(2) Agreements or decisions prohibited by this Article are null and void.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (1) may, however, be declared inapplicable to any
of the following:
-agreements or categories of agreements between or among enterprises,
-decisions or categories of decisions of associations of enterprises,
-concerted practices or categories thereof,
which contribute to the improvement of production or distribution of goods or to the
promotion of technical or economic progress, while reserving to consumers an equitable
participation in the resulting profit, and which do not
(a) subject the enterprises concerned to restrictions which are not indispensable to
the achievement of these objectives, or
(b) open up possibilities to the enterprises concerned to eliminate competition for a
substantial portion of the goods involved.1
Article 86
Incompatible with the Common Market and prohibited is the abusive exploitation by
one or more enterprises of a dominant position in the Common Market or in a substantial
part thereof, to the extent to which trade between member states is apt to be adversely
affected thereby.
Such abusive practices may consist, in particular, of the following:
(a) direct or indirect imposition of unfair purchase or sales prices or of other terms
and conditions of doing business;
(b) limitation of production, distribution or technical development to the detriment
of consumers;
(c) application of unequal terms to parties furnishing equivalent considerations,
whereby they are placed at a competitive disadvantage;
1. Oberdorfer, Gleiss & Hirsch, Common Market Cartel Law (1962) at 1-2.
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(d) subjecting the conclusion of contracts to the condition that the other parties
to them accept additional goods or services which are unrelated to the subject
matter of the contract either by their nature or by commercial custom. 2
REGULATION 17
Article 1-BASIC PROVISION
The agreements, decisions and concerted practices referred to in Article 85, paragraph
1, of the Treaty and any abuse of a dominant position on the market within the meaning
of Article 86 of the Treaty shall be prohibited, no prior decision to this effect being re-
quired; Articles 6, 7 and 23 of the present Regulation shall not be affected by this provi-
sion.
Article 2-NOATnVE CLEARANcE
At the request of the enterprises or associations of enterprises concerned, the Com-
mission may find that, according to the information it has obtained, there are, under
Article 85, paragraph 1, or Article 86 of the Treaty, no grounds for it to intervene with
respect to an agreement, decision or practice.
Article 3-DqNmo oF INRINEMENTS
(1) If, acting on request or ex officio, the Commission finds that an enterprise or
association of enterprises is infringing Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it can by
means of a decision oblige the enterprises or associations of enterprises concerned to put
an end to such infringement.
(2) A request to this effect may be submitted by:
(a) Member States;
(b) Natural and legal persons and associations of persons, who show a justified in-
terest.
(3) Without prejudice to the other provisions of the present Regulation, the Com-
mission, before taking the decision mentioned in paragraph 1, may address to the enter-
prises or associations of enterprises concerned recommendations designed to put an end
to the infringement.3
2. Id. at 69.
3. Id. at 86, 95, 99-100.
